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The global pandemic of COVID-19 has turned the spotlight on video conferencing applications like never
before. In this critical time, applications such as Zoom have experienced a surge in its user base jump
over the 300 million daily mark (ZoomBlog, 2020). The increase in use has led malicious actors to exploit
the application, and in many cases perform Zoom Bombings. Therefore forensically examining Zoom is
inevitable. Our work details the primary disk, network, and memory forensic analysis of the Zoom video
conferencing application. Results demonstrate it is possible to ﬁnd users' critical information in plain text
and/or encrypted/encoded, such as chat messages, names, email addresses, passwords, and much more
through network captures, forensic imaging of digital devices, and memory forensics. Furthermore we
elaborate on interesting anti-forensics techniques employed by the Zoom application when contacts are
deleted from the Zoom application's contact list.
© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Digital evidence acquired from video conferencing applications
may prove useful in investigations and are used by individuals in all
sectors. Applications like Skype, Google Video/Messaging series,
and Microsoft Teams have been more commonly used in recent
years (Abbott, 2020). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic,1 many
schools, businesses, and people have turned to the Zoom video
conferencing application to communicate with one another. This
rapid increase of user trafﬁc has led to scrutiny and suspicion
regarding the cybersecurity practices of the company after major
exploits were found within its protocols. These security issues have
led to privacy breaches committed through Zoom Bombings
(O'Flaherty, 2020; Lorenz and Alba, 2020) and the exploitation of
basic protocols. Zoom Bombings involve unwanted conference disruptions of any kind, including, but not limited to, the projection of
illicit images and the use of verbal profanity, which could be a form
of criminal harassment (Ofﬁce, 2020; Setera, 2020).
The most notable security issues come in Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) reports. Zoom published a security report

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: ibaggili@newhaven.edu (I. Baggili).
1
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/index.html.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.fsidi.2021.301107
2666-2817/© 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

in 2018 detailing two major CVEs. CVE-2018-157152 showed how
malicious actors could take control of users’ screens, spoof chat
messages, and control other aspects of the meeting. CVE-2020114433 detailed how the Windows Zoom IT Installer, which deletes
ﬁles and data before reinstalling Zoom, could be exploited to delete
ﬁles a user would not normally be allowed to delete. Additional
vulnerabilities were found in the Zoom application and Zoom has
responded with patches for these issues (Zoom, 2020c).
As video conferencing applications continue to be the main
communication method during events such as this pandemic, it is
important that we understand the forensic artifacts produced by
these systems. Our work aims to investigate the digital evidence
produced by the Zoom application and provides an analysis of the
critical data that can be found. The devices investigated in our work
include a Samsung Galaxy S6, an iPhone 5s, a Windows 10 Virtual
Machine (VM), and an Apple MacBook Pro.
To date, and to the best of our knowledge, there has not been a
formal forensic analysis of the Zoom application and therefore our
work contributes as follows:

2
https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/360020436071-Security-CVE-201815715.
3
https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/360043036451-Security-CVE-202011443.

A. Mahr, M. Cichon, S. Mateo et al.

Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation 36 (2021) 301107

 A primary disk, memory, and network forensic analysis of the
Zoom platform.
 A collection of Zoom application digital forensic artifacts shared
on the Artifact Genome Project4 (Grajeda et al., 2018).
 A collection of SQL queries that can be used by digital forensic
investigators to extract relevant data from the application
databases.

and forensics of social messaging applications such as WhatsApp,
Viber, Tango, and ooVoo. Their work concluded it was possible to
ﬁnd user information within the application data folders. Additionally, it demonstrated some of these applications stored publicly
accessible user data on their servers and transmitted plaintext information on the network.
Primary work was also conducted on the network forensics of
WhatsApp, and focused on decrypting the WhatsApp call signaling
protocol (Karpisek et al., 2015). The researchers described how to
decrypt the network trafﬁc and obtain forensic artifacts that relate
to: a) WhatsApp phone numbers, b) WhatsApp server IPs, c)
WhatsApp audio codec (Opus), d) WhatsApp call duration, and e)
WhatsApp's call termination.
Similarly, Anglano et al. (2017) investigated the Telegram
application and showed that message history, contacts and other
user information may be reconstructed by forensic examiners.
Lastly, Al Mutawa et al. (2012) conducted a primary analysis of
social networking applications on mobile devices. Their work
demonstrated that user information such as user settings, chat
messages, and timestamps could be found in plaintext stored in
two of the examined devices, except for the Blackberry device.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents previous
research and other related work. Section 3, outlines the tools used
to conduct our research. Section 4, discusses the applied methodology, while Section 5, discusses our analysis and results. Section 6,
provides SQL queries which aim to speed up relevant data acquisition during investigations. Lastly, Section 7, concludes our work
while Section 8 presents future work.
2. Related work
To the best of our knowledge, our methodical analysis of the
Zoom application is the ﬁrst of its kind involving multiple device
platforms. Existing research on related applications is also limited
to the Skype application, even though there are multiple types of
applications used by millions to communicate with others.
The next subsections highlight related research conducted on
similar applications.

2.3. Other related applications
During the last decade, similar research has also been conducted
on other types of devices that may be used for communication.
Some examples include, Android vault applications (Zhang et al.,
2017), smartwatch devices (Baggili et al., 2015), portable web
browsers (Marrington et al., 2012), drones (Clark et al., 2017),
Amazon Kindle (Iqbal et al., 2014), health and ﬁtness applications
(Hassenfeldt et al., 2019), home IoT devices (Dorai et al., 2018),
Amazon's Echo Dot (Chung et al., 2017), virtual reality (Casey,
Baggili and Yarramreddy, 2019; Casey, Lindsay-Decusati, Baggili
and Breitinger, 2019; Yarramreddy et al., 2018) and more.

2.1. Video conferencing applications
Research shows that for the last ten years, Skype has emerged
from the rest as being one of the most forensically examined video
conferencing application. Skype was created sixteen years ago
(Whent, 2012).
For instance, Simon and Slay (2010) examined the process used
to acquire the physical memory locations and application data of
Skype within Android and Windows devices. Al-Saleh and Forihat
(2013) explored the ﬂash memory Skype artifacts on Android
concluding that there is a persistence pattern used by the Skype
application. They found evidence of Skype calls, chats, and meeting
IDs in NAND and RAM many hours after the calls and chats took
place.
On the other hand, Azab et al. (2012) characterized network
trafﬁc from the Skype application and demonstrated the difﬁculties
forensic experts face when trying to intercept or analyze this trafﬁc.
The work also identiﬁed and discussed the differences discovered
in the trafﬁc between older and different versions of the Skype
application. Subsequently, Majeed (2016) explored the behavior of
Skype, Facebook, and Twitter within the Windows 10 environment.
It was discovered that Skype stored plaintext chat messages as well
as other information pertaining to a user on disk.
In the last ten years, research related to the forensics of video
conferencing applications heavily focused on Skype (Levinson et al.,
2011; Chang et al., 2013; Teng and Lin, 2012; Al Barghuthi and Said,
2013). To elaborate on that literature is beyond the scope of our
work.

3. Apparatus
The hardware and software used to conduct this research are
presented on Table A.4, Appendix A.
4. Methodology
Forensic research of the Zoom application was conducted in four
phases: scenario creation and setup, data acquisition, data analysis,
and SQLite database query creation. Due to experiments being
conducted at a time when Zoom was constantly updating and
patching the application's latest vulnerabilities in all OS platforms,5
not all tests were conducted on the same version of the software. In
fact, it was decided not to update at all to the latest version, until all
tests were ﬁnalized. Nonetheless, even after declining to update the
Zoom application after each use, Zoom forced an update to the
newest version. Surprisingly, this happened only in the Android
and Windows VM, and not the Apple devices. The newest version
tested at the time was 5.1.2, and was tested across all devices to
note any differences between Zoom versions. We note that only
limited tests that yielded important results from previous versions
were conducted with the latest version of Zoom.
Table A.4 in Appendix A demonstrates all tools used to conduct
this research. The devices tested were used to simulate various use
cases of the Zoom platform. Details of these four phases and results
are found in the next two subsections and Sections 5 and 6.

2.2. Messaging & social media applications
As mobile adoption increased, forensics research followed that
trend and focused on social messaging mobile applications. Similar
to Skype, research has shown that these types of applications also
store important user information on the device.
For instance, Walnycky et al. (2015) investigated the security

4

5
https://support.zoom.us/hc/en-us/articles/201362233-Where-Do-I-DownloadThe-Latest-Version.

https://agp.newhaven.edu.
2
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4.1. Setup & scenario creation

generated root certiﬁcate into the current user's Trusted Root Certiﬁcation Authorities store” (Lawrence, 2019). At the time of testing
Fiddler, the latest version of Zoom was 5.0.2, and it was only successfully tested on desktop applications. Unfortunately, Fiddler and
Zoom did not work well together through the Fiddler proxy when
using the mobile applications, thus, the mobile trafﬁc captured
turned out to be unfruitful for this research. Nevertheless, network
trafﬁc packets containing critical data may be similar regardless of
the type of device used as it was conﬁrmed using two different
operating systems, macOS and Windows.
Subsequently, FTK Imager was used at the end of each major
round of testing in the Windows VM to capture its physical disk
image. FTK and Comae DumpIt tools were also used to acquire the
VM's memory when the application was active and terminated.
Finally, Magnet Acquire was used to collect a physical image of the
Android and a logical image of the iOS device. It is important to note
that even though the iPhone was jailbroken, Magnet Acquire only
offered support to acquire a logical image of the device (Magnet
Forensics, 2020). After conducting preliminary tests, it was
concluded that the macOS and iOS application data were similar
and therefore the decision was made not to physically image the
macOS device. The macOS data directory was then acquired logically using the ﬁle system.

This phase consisted of testing the Zoom application's features
on all devices by mimicking free Basic and Licensed account usage.
To acquire a complete dataset, all mobile devices were ﬁrst reset
and rooted. Moreover, to test the desktop applications, a macOS
laptop was used and a clean Windows 10 Virtual Machine was
downloaded from the Microsoft Developer's website.6 Additionally,
all Zoom applications were downloaded from the Zoom website
and respective mobile stores.7
Creating each scenario stemmed from testing common user
actions to more advanced features that Basic Zoom accounts did not
include. Thus, Basic accounts were created and tested. Then, all
accounts were switched to Licensed University accounts that all
students at the University of New Haven8 possess. These Licensed
accounts are now used by the University to conduct remote online
learning activities.
Within these test environments, different application features
and settings were examined. Tests were conducted with the devices communicating as a group, one-on-one, and individually to
allow for an understanding of the interactions between different
device platforms. All of the tests were conducted by creating
meetings that used a mix of each device's Personal Meeting IDs and
General Meeting IDs generated by Zoom. These meetings were
created through the Zoom application, scheduled using the Outlook
Calendar plugin, and started through the contacts page of Zoom.
The following tested features yielded the most important results:












5. Analysis & experimental results
In order to analyze and extract relevant artifacts from all the
forensic acquisitions, different tools shown in Table A.4 in Appendix
A were utilized along with some manual analysis. In this section,
details on artifacts found across all devices are summarized in their
own subsections related to disk, network, and memory. It is
important to note that most of the artifacts found were similar
across tested devices. We will elaborate on any artifacts that were
deemed unique to a speciﬁc device. All major artifacts and their ﬁle
paths found within the tested devices are highlighted in Tables 1
and 2.
Table 1 contains details regarding the location of important artifacts found on the disk of their corresponding device. Table 2 lists
important data found within the ﬁles stored on disk, memory
dumps, and network trafﬁc.

Added contacts
Deleted contacts
Searched for keywords using the application's Search feature
Chatted through the Chat feature only
- Exchanged text ﬁles and other types of ﬁles, such as pictures
- Exchanged screenshots taken in the chat
- Exchanged URLs
Conducted a Zoom video meeting and sent and received chat
messages and ﬁles
Saved in video meetings locally and to the cloud
Installed the Zoom Outlook plugin to schedule meetings
Implemented the Twitter application from the Zoom Marketplace and tested the following:
- Sent tweets
- Started meeting through Twitter chat bot
Attended a webinar as an attendee and panelist

5.1. Zoom data directory structure
To identify major artifacts and the location they were stored in
all devices, it is critical to understand how the Zoom application
organizes this data. In each device's respective Zoom data directory,
there were numerous folders created containing different types of
ﬁles. It appears the application names main directories, some
database ﬁles and some of its tables after the account's Jabber ID
(JID), such as “9z4z2l54qbswpudnk0r_ba@xmpp.zoom.us”; . This
JID uniquely identiﬁes individual users, as well as user chat groups
within the stored Zoom data. JIDs are the user's Extensible
Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) chat addresses. JID values
are constructed ﬁrst with the “localpart”, which in this case would
be “9z4z2l54qbswpudnk0r_ba”, the domain part, and resource part
followed after the “@” character (Saint-Andre, 2011). It is uncertain
what type of encoding or encryption Zoom uses to create the JID's
local values.
Analysis of the Zoom directory on each device conﬁrmed that
Zoom creates separate data folders for each account that was logged into the device. Since two types of user accounts were tested, a
Basic and a Licensed school account, separate ﬁle folders were
found for both accounts. Note, some of these actions do not occur
unless the user is logged into the Zoom application. If no account is
logged-in, then Zoom uses its default zoomus.db and

4.2. Data acquisition
In this phase, network and disk forensics were performed on all
devices with some limitations, while memory dumps were
captured only on the Windows Virtual Machine.
To acquire network trafﬁc from exchanged Zoom communications, a unique wireless hotspot was created to isolate each device's
network. To conﬁrm all Zoom's network trafﬁc was encrypted,
Wireshark was used to capture the packets while each test took
place. We used Fiddler9 to also capture, decrypt, and decode HTTPS
network trafﬁc. Fiddler decrypts HTTPS trafﬁc by generating a root
certiﬁcate that the user is required to trust on the device under
analysis. For example, when using Windows, it imports “the

6
7
8
9

f.
https://zoom.us/download#client_4meeting.
https://www.newhaven.edu/.
https://www.telerik.com/ﬁddler.
3

A. Mahr, M. Cichon, S. Mateo et al.

Forensic Science International: Digital Investigation 36 (2021) 301107

Table 1
Important data path directories and ﬁles found in disk across device.
File
ID

Path

Account Device

Description

1.1
1.2

vol_vol20/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db
private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/“USER JID”.xmpp.zoom.us/
“USER JID”@zoom.us.asyn.db
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db
vol_vol20/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.db
private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/“USER JID”.xmpp.zoom.us/
“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.db
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.db
vol_vol20/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db

Any
Any

Android
iOS

Chats
…

Any
Any
Any
Any

macOS
Windows
Android
iOS

…
…
Contacts
…

Any
Any
Any

macOS
…
Windows …
Android Index Information and
Cached Data
iOS
…

1.3
1.4
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
4.1
4.2

private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/“USER JID”.xmpp.zoom.us/
“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.idx.db
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db
vol_vol20/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.sync.db

4.3
4.4
5.1

private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/“USER JID”.xmpp.zoom.us/
“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.sync.db
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.sync.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/“USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/”; USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.sync.db
vol_vol/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/zoommeeting.db

5.2
5.3
5.4
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
7.1

private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/zoommeeting.db
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/zoommeeting.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/zoommeeting.db
vol_vol20/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/zoomus.db
private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/zoomus.db
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/zoomus.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/zoomus.db
/vol_vol20/data/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/data/“Hashed File Name”.db

7.2
7.3
7.4
8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
9
10

/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Documents/data/“Hashed File Name”
Library/Application Support/zoom.us/data/“Hashed File Name”.db
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/“User JID”@xmpp.zoom.us/“; Hashed File Name”.db
vol_vol20/data/us.zoom.videomeetings/ﬁles/data/SSBAvatarCacheIndex.ini
private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Application ID”/Library/Preferences/Avatar Cache Index.plist
Library/Preferences/Avatar Cache Index.plist/
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom/data/SSBAvatarCacheIndex.ini
/private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/“Container ID”/Library/Preferences/
us.zoom.videomeetings.plist
/private/var/moible/Containers/Shared/AppGroup/“App Group ID”/Library/Caches/contacts.db

11
12
13

/AppData/Roaming/Zoom Plugin/ex2smtp.json
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom Plugin/userSetting.json
/AppData/Roaming/Zoom Plugin/alternateHosts.json

Any
Any
Any
Any
Any

macOS
…
Windows …
Android Msg Invitations and Contact
Requests
iOS
…

macOS
…
Windows …
Android In-Meeting Encoded or
Encrypted Chats
Any
iOS
…
Any
macOS
…
Any
Windows …
Any
Android User Account Information
Any
iOS
…
Any
macOS
…
Any
Windows …
Any
Android Temporary Webinar
Database
Any
iOS
…
Any
macOS
…
Any
Windows …
Any
Android Avatar URL Cache Index
Any
iOS
…
Any
macOS
…
Any
Windows …
Any
iOS
Recent Meeting Settings and
Actions
Any
iOS
bpList File of Contact Names
& JIDS
Licensed Windows Outlook Plugin JSON
Licensed Windows Outlook Plugin JSON
Licensed Windows Outlook Plugin JSON

Any
Any
Any

devices. The average entropy was determined to be 7.910 (rounded),
which suggests ﬁle encryption.

zoommeeting.db databases to store information. Details about
these ﬁles are discussed on Section 5.2.
Consequently, in the latest Zoom application (5.1.2) and previous ones tested, it was discovered that Zoom created one folder for
each account identiﬁed by its JID. For example, one folder named
“1i-y1fdkqskijzvp3uidhq@xmpp.zoom.us,” which contained databases of interest, the user's proﬁle avatar picture, and other contacts' avatars the user has communicated with directly or indirectly
as being part of a Zoom session. Moreover, this directory also
contains a folder that stores any media ﬁles that are exchanged in
Zoom.
On the other hand, Zoom application versions tested prior to the
latest used to create another folder “1i-y1fdkqsijzvp3uidhq@xmpp.zoom.us_sip,” which contained a possible
encrypted database ﬁle named zoom.sip.enc.db. According to
Zoom, any VoIP media is encrypted with AES-128 encryption
(Zoom Video Communications, 2020). This ﬁle is possibly related to
Zoom's H.323 and Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) device support
for Zoom Rooms (Zoom, 2020a). Note, no SIP devices were tested in
this investigation. To speculate this type of ﬁle was encrypted, the
Shannon Entropy was calculated for each ﬁle found across all

5.2. Major artifacts found in disk
In this subsection, all of our main artifacts are discussed. Note, a
place holder such as “USER JID” was used in Tables 1 and 2, and this
results section to identify path location names and Jabber ID (JID)
values as they are unique to an individual device and Zoom user
account.
5.2.1. “USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db - Zoom Chat feature
This database (Tables 1 and 2, File ID 1) stores numerous tables
with information pertaining to devices associated with the Zoom
account, as well as chat session information such as messages, ﬁles,
emojis exchanged through the Zoom Chat feature, devices status,
some information about other contacts, in Chat feature calls, and
more.

10

4

https://github.com/mattnotmax/entropy.
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Table 2
Important artifacts extracted across all forensic acquisition Type.

The ﬁrst data of interest was stored in the “mmkv” table, which
contains conﬁguration settings about the Zoom session. For
example, this table stores the end-to-end encryption public certiﬁcate and a private Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) text block which
we assume could contain the private key. Additionally, this table
stores the PEM password. The text was found to be encoded or
encrypted with an algorithm we were unable to decipher. Nevertheless, according to Zoom, they use Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) 256 GCM algorithm at the application layer to encrypt presentation content (Zoom Video Communications, 2020). Similar to
the previous table, the “msg_active_devices” also stores an encoded/encrypted certiﬁcate, PEM, and password for each active device the account was logged into.
Other tables of interest involve chat messages exchanged
through the Chat feature (see Appendix B; Figure B.1). A new table
is created in this database named after either a group ID, if more
than two people are messaging, or the JID of the user the chats are
exchanged with. This also includes messages exchanged when using the Twitter bot feature. The messages are stored in plain text
along with timestamps and names of the users in the chat, among
other things. More importantly, these messages are stored in all of
the devices users utilize in the chat. Thus, providing extra venues of
interest when looking for this type of evidence.
Subsequently, details on the different types of ﬁles exchanged
through the chat, such as images and screenshots, are stored in the
“zoom_mm_ﬁle” and “zoom_mm_ﬁle_download_table” tables (see
Appendix B; Figure B.2). It is important to note that these tables also
contain the local path names where the ﬁles are stored in the device and the “zoom_mm_ﬁle”, speciﬁcally, contains partially
Base64 encoded URLs of where those ﬁles are stored in a Zoom
server. Decoding those revealed data to be partially a combination
of the sender's JID, Zoom's web ﬁle ID, and something else that it is
believed to be Zoom's domain name. Moreover, this database stores
emojis and any HTTPS URLs that were exchanged through the Chat
feature. Finally, Zoom stores a call history with user names and a
Zoom assigned number in this database along with information of
any type of searches conducted within the application using the
Search feature.

contact information of these users was found in the database
despite having no direct communication with most of them.
Moreover, the amount of users found in the database depends on
the type of account a user possesses, i.e., student, faculty, etc. This
may potentially be a security risk as anyone who gains illegal access
to a domain account could acquire information about users without
their knowledge. This also includes alumni who have no active
access to the University, however, by using their student email
address they could still login into Zoom and access this information.
During the analysis of the iPhone image, a binary pList ﬁle titled
“contacts.db” was also found masquerading as a database and
contains a simpliﬁed list of the names and JIDs of a Zoom user's
contacts.
5.2.3. “User JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db - cache
This database (Tables 1 and 2, File ID 3) combines cached data
about the two previously mentioned databases above. The two
main tables of interest include the “mm_buddy_index_cache_table” which includes a more simpliﬁed list of information for a
user's contacts such as the contacts JIDs, names, nicknames, and
emails. The “mm_msg_cache_table” also contains a recent history
of messages that were exchanged on Zoom's Chat feature. Consequently, partial fragments of chat messages, ﬁle names of ﬁles that
were exchanged through the Chat feature, and users' contact information were found in some tables stored in blobs.
5.2.4. “USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.sync.db - contact requests
In order to make and maintain connections inside and outside of
a Zoom's user account domain, a user must make a request to
become a contact. Zoom stores these contact requests in this
database (Tables 1 and 2, File ID 4). When a user sends or receives a
contact request, this database stores information about the JID of
the requesting user or target contact, the timestamp associated
with the request, and a request message. This message may contain
an email address, the display name of the user, and other contact
information. Note, this database does not delete the contact request
when deleting a contact from the Zoom application. This is a way to
verify that at some point a user that was deleted had contact with
such user.

5.2.2. “USER JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.db & Contacts.db - contacts
The Zoom application stores a user's contacts in this database
(Tables 1 and 2, File ID 2). The main table of interest is the
“zoom_mm_buddy” table which contains the names, JIDs, emails,
phone numbers, proﬁle picture active URLs and the path where
those were stored locally in the device, work departments, job
positions, and other private user information in plain text. When
analyzing the same database found in the Licensed University account, a large directory of students, staff, and faculty was found. The

5.2.5. zoommeeting.db - zoom video meetings
This database (Tables 1 and 2, File ID 5) stores important
encrypted and plain text information about the most recent video
meeting conducted through Zoom desktop applications only. The
important data was stored in two tables. Table “zoom_conf_cc_gen2”
contains information about recorded meetings saved locally on the
device and any closed captioned plain text that has been provided
during the meeting. Data of interest includes timestamps, plain text
5
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results depending on the type of user attending the webinar.
Moreover, the main database of interest, with a name that is always
encoded/encrypted such as “cxPKzMaNQUWBFd9HwEr3Ig ¼ ¼ .db”,
and that we believe is the meeting ID, is no longer stored permanently in the Zoom data directory. The last Zoom version tested
where the database remained in the directory was 4.6.2; however,
the latest version we have tested (5.1.2) does not store this database
anymore and it actually removes it from the Zoom data directory
once the webinar ends. Unfortunately, our attempts to recover this
database from a the Windows VM forensic acquired image were not
successful, as it was not found using the Autopsy tool. Nevertheless,
as an attendee or panelist of a webinar, one has always the chance to
acquire the live database while the webinar is taking place.
Consequently, this database contains two main tables of interest, the table “zoom_qa_buddies” which stores a list of all the
people who attended the meeting to include panelists and normal
attendees. The table stores the name of the user, whether it is the
original user name or one the user assigned themselves for the
webinar, and a unique JID generated for the webinar such as
“wu_92104247635_zo0i6r1uqgqntrp0cyef6g#159228971773 433@
xmpp.zoom.us”; . This JID includes three unique strings of interest
assigned by Zoom, such as the webinar's meeting ID, the user's
webinar's JID, and a timestamp of the time the user joined the
webinar. It is important to note that users who join the webinar
without providing a name or signing in are still identiﬁed, but only
by their unique webinar JID.
The ﬁelds of interest in this table are viewable depending on the
type of attendee and Zoom account (Licensed or Basic). As a normal
attendee, users never see any other attendee's names on the
interface while conducting a webinar, however, panelists do. Thus,
attending the webinar as a panelist, this table stores all of the users'
names in the database. As a normal user, the only names stored in
the database are the ones from the panelists that the user can see
on the application. Nevertheless, the latter does not a apply to
Licensed accounts belonging to the same organization. As a normal
user, one is able to see all of the names of attendees stored in the
database even when they were not viewable in the Zoom webinar
interface.
The ﬁnal table of interest, “zoom_qa_messages”, stores a list of
all the questions and answers in the webinar, their timestamps, a
unique sender JID, and sender name of the person who asked or
answered the question. The table also stores ﬂags pertaining to
whether the question was answered live, read, dismissed, or
deleted, and whether the question was marked by a user to be
asked as “anonymous” or sent in private. It is interesting to note
that even when users opt to ask a question as “anonymous” in the
webinar, the names of the users are still stored in the database
providing no anonymity. Subsequently, the database stored in a
panelist device would contain all of the questions submitted, while
the normal attendee would only contain the questions that had
been answered by panelists.

closed captioning, and a 1/0 code to denote when the recording
started and ended respectively. If there were any messages
exchanged within the video meeting chat while it was recording, the
application saved this recording in the local disk along with a plain
text transcript of the messages exchanged and the closed captioning
text. The “zoom_conf_chat_gen2” table stores the encrypted inmeeting chat messages exchanged from the most recent meeting
session. Data of interest includes, encrypted messages, plain text
timestamps, encrypted sender and receiver names, and entries
denoting whether the meeting started recording and when it ended.
On the other hand, Zoom mobile applications are not capable of
saving recorded meetings locally to the device, but only to the cloud
with a Licenced account. Therefore, it is believed that this may be
one of the reasons why this database was found with no data when
testing the mobile devices.
5.2.6. zoomus.db & avatar cache - user, device conﬁgurations &
more
This database (Tables 1 and 2, File ID 6), stores important data
pertaining to user account and Zoom account conﬁgurations. For
instance, the “z_cert_info” table stores certiﬁcate data from certificates that have been trusted by the Zoom application.
The “zoom_conf_avatar_image_cache” table stores cached
active proﬁle pictures’ URLs, their path location on the device, and
timestamps. This table stores this information only when users
conduct in video Zoom meetings and the information that is saved
belongs to all of the users that have taken part of the meeting. It is
essential to note that this information also appears in the “USER
JID”@xmpp.zoom.us.db - Contacts database previously mentioned
above; however, that information updates every time a user
changes their proﬁle picture. Moreover, there is another avatar
cache index ﬁle that Zoom creates in all devices (Tables 1 and 2, File
ID 8). This ﬁle updates every time a user changes their proﬁle
picture as well, and it only includes the URL and timestamp when
the picture was downloaded to the device. Consequently, our results so far indicate these URLs do not expire and one can easily
access them on a web browser. However, if a user does change the
proﬁle picture, then the link previously stored on the mentioned
ﬁles would become invalid.
The “zoom_kv” table contains important account conﬁgurations
such as Zoom application version, the last time the client was
connected, IPs, ports, URLs Zoom uses to connect on each session
(Zoom Video Communications, 2020), the token refresh URL Zoom
uses every time it needs to update the session token, encoded/
encrypted Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) single signon (SSO) login with password, meeting ID, and more.
The “zoom_meet_history” table stores information about
meeting sessions that were recorded to the device using the
desktop application. Important artifacts include the host ID, the
path location where the recording was saved, the name of the
meeting, the time the recording started, and its duration.
The ﬁnal table of interest in this database is the “zoom_user_account_enc” table which stores encrypted user information
about the account that is logged-in. This includes username, Zoom
refresh token, email, proﬁle picture URL, ﬁrst name and last name
of the account owner, and more.

5.2.8. Zoom Outlook plugin - scheduled meetings
The Zoom plugin for Microsoft Outlook was tested on the
Windows VM with a Zoom Licensed account as part of this
research. This plugin is part of the tools Zoom provides to implement it with the Zoom desktop application. This plugin allows users
to schedule meetings through the Outlook application with one
click (Zoom, 2020b).
Important artifacts discovered through experiments revealed
that JSON ﬁles are created when meetings are scheduled depending
on the settings of the meeting. Three of those ﬁles were deemed
important and discussed in this section (Tables 1 and 2, File IDs
11e13). For instance, the “ex2smtp.json” stores Outlook Simple
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) data and meeting participants' email

5.2.7. Zoom webinars - attendees and Q & A
To obtain a better perspective of the features that Zoom offers,
attending a webinar as a normal attendee and as a panelist was
necessary. However, being able to achieve these tasks was one of
the hardest tests to conduct in this research. Webinars are a paid
feature of Zoom and most of the time one has to be invited or
registered to an event in order to attend one.
Nevertheless, the outcomes from these tests yielded different
6
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addresses. This ﬁle updates every time a meeting is scheduled,
updated, or canceled. The “alternateHosts.json” ﬁle stores the
display names and email addresses of users that have been added
as co-hosts when scheduling meetings. Lastly, the “userSetting.json” ﬁle contains user information, meeting invitation details, and
settings pertaining to the user's personal default meeting. Critical
artifacts found in this ﬁle include, the account owner's name, ﬁrst
and last name, email address, personal meeting ID, personal JID,
and the local path of the device where the user's proﬁle avatar
picture was stored along with the active avatar URL. Additionally,
this ﬁle contains more important data already found in plain text,
but was also encoded in Base 64. It appears this encoded data
contains invitation information that could be sent to users who
may not have Zoom installed.

performed on the Windows Virtual Machine while testing different
features of the Zoom application. This analysis was limited as our
main intent was to investigate the difference between memory
captures taken when the Zoom application was actively open and
after the application had completely exited the system. The goal
was to search for critical data (i.e., chat messages) that we had
already found on disk and network trafﬁc and how much of that
data would be removed from memory when exiting the application. Major tools used in this analysis are Volatility and Strings
(Appendix A; Table A.4).
Results from this analysis demonstrated that system Random
Access Memory (RAM) stores a plethora of information that could
be very useful for investigators, especially when conducting investigations in the ﬁeld based on triage. Important data found in
memory before and after the Zoom application was terminated
includes user and contacts' information such as plain text and
encrypted names, email addresses, and JIDs, proﬁle avatar's URLs,
and encrypted and plain text chat messages, webinar information,
and more. Moreover, it is believed that since Zoom does fetch account history when ﬁrst connecting to the application, a lot more
information is passed through memory that is already stored in the
databases in the disk; this includes end-to-end encryption certiﬁcates, PEM key and passwords, chat history and call history, ﬁle
names that have been exchanged during chat sessions, scheduled
meeting information such as meeting ID's and passwords, keywords searched in the Zoom application, and much more. It is
important to note that the encrypted messages exchanged in an invideo meeting could also be found in plain text in memory if the
meeting is being recorded. This is due to Zoom storing a transcript
of the video recording with the messages. Moreover, if Closed
Captioning (CC) is enabled, a transcript in plain text is also stored in
disk and could be found in memory.
Nevertheless, our results differed based on the type of tool used
to analyze the memory. As in the case of Volatility, all major artifacts were found in the memory acquired when the application was
opened; this makes sense since the process was active (see
Appendix B; Figure B.4). However, when analyzing the memory
acquired after the application was terminated, most of the information could not be located using the “yarascan” plugin. Additionally, the Strings tool was run on the memory captures and
surprisingly, Strings proved to be a powerful tool as it extracted the
artifacts Volatility could not ﬁnd (see Appendix B; Figure B.5). Thus,
it is important to note that there is still a difference in terms of the
amount of data that is collected when a process is running as
opposed to when is closed. Nevertheless, even when terminating
the process a lot of evidence could still be found and help
immensely in an investigation.

5.3. Major artifacts found in network trafﬁc
According to Zoom, they secure network trafﬁc by using Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) and encrypting it with
256-bit Transport Layer Security (TLS) encryption standard (Zoom
Video Communications, 2020). Our research proved this to be
correct when capturing network packets using the Wireshark tool.
Nevertheless, our investigation went a step further to discover the
types of encrypted artifacts Zoom transfers over the network. As
stated in Section 4.2, the Fiddler tool was used to capture and
decrypt this trafﬁc when conducting tests on the desktop
applications.
Our results were successful for the most part as the Fiddler tool
was able to decrypt most trafﬁc (Table 2, File ID NET). Results
include login credentials (username and password) that were
transferred in the network when attempting to login to the application using a Basic account and a Licensed account (Appendix B;
Figure B.3). The only difference between these accounts is the fact
that Zoom uses SAML single-sign-on (SSO) through the browser
when logging into a Licensed account. This is a less secure way to
sign in compared to using the Zoom application because the
password is transferred through HTTPS on the network as well
which allowed the Fiddler tool to decrypt it. Moreover, other
important artifacts that are fetched by the Zoom application while
logging in include account email, JIDs (Jabber IDs), cookies, session
access tokens, device ID, MAC address, proﬁle picture, personal
meeting room invitation containing the personal meeting ID and
meeting password, a list of recorded meetings saved on the cloud,
any Outlook plugin data and calendar implementation, any chat
history that took place using the Zoom Chat feature, and more.
Consequently, other tests performed during video meetings and
in-meeting chats revealed that no messages were found in the
network trafﬁc. However, ﬁle names of ﬁles that were sent through
the chat did appear in the network trafﬁc. Moreover, this was also
true when testing the Zoom Chat feature only. However, the Zoom
Chat feature has more capabilities than the in-video meeting chat,
thus, additional artifacts were discovered in the trafﬁc. This includes, any HTTPS links that were sent in the chat and were activated through Zoom's link preview feature, Graphics Interchange
Format (GIFs), and any other type of ﬁles that were received. Lastly,
scheduled meeting information, recorded meeting information,
keywords searched through the Search feature in Zoom, and ﬁle
history could be viewed in the network trafﬁc when using these
features in the Zoom application.

5.5. Anti-forensic techniques
This section highlights interesting anti-forensic techniques
discovered when two people communicate through the Zoom
application interface, and one person deletes a contact, causing an
effect in both devices. These tests were conducted in all devices
using different versions11 of the Zoom application at the time.
Table 3, shows more details of these results. The ﬁrst four devices in
the table belong to the contact that was deleted, while the two at
the bottom belong to the user who deleted the contact from the
Zoom interface. Results to the right of the table show that in the
case of the Android and macOS devices, the chat history and contacts were removed from the Zoom application interface, while in
the Windows and iOS devices, only the contact was removed.

5.4. Artifacts found in memory
This section discusses a preliminary memory forensic analysis

11
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social distance. We believe the COVID-19 pandemic makes our
work even more relevant as utilizing this application has become a
necessity to society. Therefore, to the best of our knowledge, this is
the primary forensic analysis of the Zoom Video Conferencing
application. This was accomplished by conducting tests on different
devices centered around disk, memory, and network forensic acquisitions. The goal of this research was to measure Zoom application's level of security and privacy granted to protect users' data
and whether any ﬁndings would be beneﬁcial for forensic investigators and adversaries alike.
Our ﬁndings demonstrate that even when the Zoom organization has been continuously patching their application to ﬁx and
prevent security risks as presented in their blog (Zoom, 2020c), a
plethora of user information could still be found in different parts of
a system. This includes, plain text user information, such as chat
messages, proﬁle pictures, ﬁles exchanged, user contact information, and much more. Additionally, some of this data was still found
to be stored in the system even when a user had opted to delete a
contact from their application. Notwithstanding, Zoom did use
secure methods when storing some information in disk and when
transferring user account information through the network, such as
encrypted passwords and in-video meeting chat messages.
In the case of the network trafﬁc however, it was proven that
HTTPS could be decrypted using the tool Fiddler, this could be rare,
but in certain cases could still pose a threat to user privacy if access
to the device falls in the wrong hands. Furthermore, in terms of the
memory analysis, it was concluded that plenty of the evidence
already discussed could be found in memory even after the application had completely exited the system. This information could be
useful to investigators on the ﬁeld needing to prioritize collection
and analysis of evidence.
Consequently, this research demonstrated some techniques
carried out through the Zoom application that could be possibly
ﬂagged as anti-forensic. While these techniques were not true for
all tested devices, knowing that there are certain Zoom application
versions that could possibly cause a user to lose their chat and
contact history due to someone deleting them from their contacts
list without their permission is problematic. Only the account
owner should be able to delete any information in their Zoom
application and device.
Finally, our work contributed a series of SQLite Queries aimed at
assisting investigators to triage the Zoom databases for all valuable
information that may be useful in a case. Moreover, all digital artifacts collected in this investigation can be found in the Artifact
Genome Project12 repository.

Moreover, in the case of the Android, some of the critical data was
also removed from important databases and data directory, such as
chat messages and exchanged media ﬁles. Nevertheless, it was
noted that the Android device only experiences this momentarily as
the server pulls all of the chat history back to the application's
interface when exiting and reopening the Zoom application. All
other data remained in the devices as normally expected. It is
important to note that in Zoom version 5.0.2, the Windows device
had a similar effect as the Android device in removing the information from the interface.
On the other hand, the two devices shown at the bottom of the
table belonging to the user who deleted the other contact were
affected mostly as expected in the Zoom interface, databases, and
media directory. However, there were a lot of traces of data left
behind about interactions between both contacts, such as contact
information, traces of ﬁles and chat messages that were exchanged
and more. This could still be useful to identify who the user was
communicating with and some of the interactions between them.
As noted, this is an alarming breach of trust as critical information could be removed without the user's permission, even if it is
momentarily as in the case of the Android device. No information
should ever be deleted from the application and device of the user
who was being removed from someone else's contact list.
6. Creation of SQLite database queries
Due to relevant data being stored mostly in SQLite databases, a
helpful way to identify this data is through the use of database
queries which can be found in Table A.5 of Appendix A.
All of the queries aim to simplify the acquisition of information
that can be used during forensic examinations. The following
queries will provide examiners a brief overview of the chat interaction between Zoom users. Queries 1, 2, and 3 deal with simplifying the acquisition of the most recent cached message bodies,
user information, and timestamps from the chat cache table of the
“USER JID@zoom.us.idx.db”; ﬁle. However, this table does not list
the ﬁles or images that may have been sent in chats. Additional
queries have been developed, speciﬁcally Query 7, which can be
modiﬁed to search the above mentioned by utilizing the “USER
JID@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db”; database's tables for the images and
ﬁles sent within the target chat session identiﬁed by its “JID”.
Queries 4 and 5 deal with acquiring information about the
contacts a user account has and what group chats they may belong
to from the “User JID@xmpp.zoom.us.db”; database ﬁle. Query 4
selects all of the information pertaining to the entire contact base of
the user. Query 5 identiﬁes any group chats the user belongs to or
hosts as well as the contact information for the chat owner. Queries
6 through 9 provide investigators a list of the chats within a “Target
Chat Session” found in the “Chats” database. Query 6 provides a list
of the relevant information for a Chat Session such as the name of
the sender, the body of the message and the message timestamp.
Query 7 selects the sender information as well as the name of the
multimedia ﬁles sent and their timestamps. Query 8 selects the
messages that were commented on by using emojis while Query 9
selects the messages where ﬁles were sent and had been commented on. Query 10 provides investigators with the start date and
the “messageID” for the last message sent for each non-meeting
chat session a user device may have.

8. Future work
Future work should be conducted in this rapidly changing ﬁeld.
As noted research, it was difﬁcult to forensically examine Zoom
while trying to keep up with constant software updates. This shows
that data changes constantly, and while our results may be valid
now, they may become outdated. Furthermore, Zoom is not the
only video conferencing application that needs forensic analysis.
Future work should explore other applications such as Google
Meet, CISCO Webex Meetings, Bluejeans, and Microsoft Teams13.14

7. Conclusion/discussion
Zooming through the pandemic was something most of us
never imagined to happen in our lifetime. Even at this moment,
Zoom still is the primary application people use to communicate
and conduct businesses through a screen while having to maintain

12

agp.newhaven.edu.
https://www.howtogeek.com/661906/the-6-best-free-video-conferencingapps/.
14
https://www.techradar.com/best/best-video-conferencing-software.
13
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Table 3
Anti-forensic ﬁndings.
Zoom Interface

Contact &
Requests Dbs

Chats Db

Cached Db

Files in
Directory

Affected Data - Device Belonging to the Contact that Got Deleted
Deleted
Contacts

Deleted
Chats

Chat
Messages

b

Android
✓
✓
✓
macOS
✓
✓
✖
Windows
✓
✖
✖
b
iOS
✓
✖
✖
Affected Data - Device Belonging to the User
Windows
✓
✓
✓
iOS
✓
✓
✓
b

Emojis/
GIFs

Exchanged
Files

Last
Session

Call
History

Contact
History

Contact
History

File
History

✖
✖
✖
✖

✖
✖
✖
✖

✖
✖
✖
✖

✖
✖
✖
✖

✖
✖
✖
✖

✓
✓

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✖

✖
✖

a
✖/✖
✓/✖
✖/✖
✖
✖/✖
✖
✖/✖
✖
Deleting the Contact
a
✖
✓/✖
a
✖
✓/✖

Chat History/
Segments

Avatars

✓/✖

✖
✖
✖
✖

a

✓/c✓
✓/✖

✖
✖

✓
✓

✖/✖
✖/✖
✖/✖

Exchanged
Media
✓
✖
✖
✖

Key: ✓: Yes Deleted ✖: Not Deleted.
a
Note: Files were deleted from one table or folder but remain in one or more tables/folder.
b
Note: The Windows VM was the one used to delete the contacts in these devices while the iOS was used to delete the Windows.
c
Note: The results in this ﬁeld apply to Windows when interacting with the Android device.
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Appendix A. Apparatus & SQLite Queries

Table A.4
Apparatus
Hardware/Software

Use

Company

Software Version

Galaxy S6
iPhone 5s
Windows Virtual
Machine
MacBook Pro
VirtualBox
Zoom Mobile
Application
Zoom Mobile
Application
Zoom Desktop
Application
Zoom Desktop
Application
Zoom Outlook Plugin

Zoom Account
Zoom Account
Zoom Account

Samsung
Apple
Windows

Nougat 7.0
iOS 12.4.5, 12.4.6
Windows 10

Zoom Account
Hosted Windows Virtual Machine
Android Zoom Account

Apple
Oracle VM VirtualBox
Zoom Video Communications

Catalina 10.15.4, 10.5.5
6.1.4
4.6.9, 4.6.10, 4.6.11, 5.0.2 (25692.0524), 5.1.2 (28652.0706)

iOS Zoom Account

Zoom Video Communications

4.6.9 (19213.0327), 5.0.2 (24042.05.09), 5.1.1 (28562.0629)

Windows Zoom Account

Zoom Video Communications

macOS Zoom Account

Zoom Video Communications

4.6.9 (19213.0327), 4.6.10 (20033.0407), 5.0.2 (24046.0510), 5.1.2
(28642.0705)
4.6.11(20561.0413), 5.0.2 (24030.0508), 5.1.2 (28648.0705)

Schedule Meetings in Windows
Desktop
Observe Live Network Trafﬁc (all
devices)
Full Image Creator (Android & iOS)
Memory Acquisition
Full Image Creator and Memory
Capture
Full Image Viewer
Android Data Extraction Tool

Zoom Video Communications

5.1.2 (27830.0612)

Wireshark

3.2.3

Magnet Forensics
Comae
AccessData

2.25.0.20236
3.0.20200224.1
4.3.0.18

The Sleuth Kit
Android Studio Developers

4.14.0
1.0.41, Version 29.0.6e6198805
3.11.2
0.9.7 BETA
V2.82

Desktop Memory Analysis
String Finder
Decrypt Network Trafﬁc
Decryption Tool

DB
checkra1n
Senior Recognized XDA Developer
Chainﬁre
Volatility Foundation
Free Software Foundation, Inc.
Progress Software Corporation
Base64

Volatility 2.6.1 & Volatility 3 1.0.0-beta.1
2.33.1
5.0.20202.18177
Online

File Entropy Calculator
File System Manager

GitHub user: mattnotmax
TIGI Software

N/A
3.7 Build 7

Wireshark
Magnet Acquire
DumpIt
FTK Imager
Autopsy
Android Debug Bridge
(ADB)
DB Browser for SQLite
checkra1n
SuperSU
Volatility
GNU Strings
Fiddler 4
Base64 Encoder/
Decoder
Entropy
Filza File Manager

View Sqlite/DB ﬁles
iOS Jailbreak Tool
Android Jailbreak Tool
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Table A.5
SQLite Queries
Query Query
ID

Database

Result

1

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db

Lists Recent Cached Chat Messages by
Timestamp

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db

Lists Recent Cached Messages ONLY
sent BY Account User

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.idx.db

Lists Recent Cached Messages ONLY
sent TO Account User

2

3

4
5

6

7

8

9

10

Select senderName, groupID, buddyID, body, strftime(’%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%
S’,messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as timeStamp from
mm_msg_cache_table ORDER by timeStamp asc;
Select senderName, groupID, buddyID, body, strftime(’%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%
S’,messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as timeStamp from
mm_msg_cache_table where sentByMe ¼ 1 ORDER by timeStamp asc;
Select senderName, groupID, buddyID, body, strftime(’%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%
S’,messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as timeStamp from
mm_msg_cache_table where sentByMe ¼ 0 ORDER by timeStamp asc;
Select jid, ﬁrstName, lastName, phoneNo, phoneNumber email, picPath, avatarUrl,
meetingNumber from zoom_mm_buddy order by ﬁrstName;
Select groupID, name as participants, ﬁrstName as ownerFirstName, lastName as
ownerLastName, email as ownerEmail from zoom_mm_buddy, zoom_mm_group where
zoom_mm_buddy.jid ¼ zoom_mm_group.ownerID;
Select messageID, senderName, body, strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S0 ,
messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as messageTimestamp from “TARGET
CHAT TABLE” order by messageTimestamp;
Select A.messageID, A.senderName, A.body, strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S0 ,
A.messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as messageTimestamp, B.name,
B.localpath from “TARGET CHAT TABLE” as A, zoom_mm_ﬁle as B WHERE
A.messageID ¼ B.messageID order by messageTimestamp;
Select A.messageID, senderName, body, strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S0 ,
messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as messageTimestamp, emoji as
emojiComment, strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S0 , ﬁrst_emoji_t/1000, ‘unixepoch’,
‘localtime’) as commentTimestamp from “TARGET CHAT TABLE” as A,
emoji_comment_table as B where A.messageID ¼ B.msgid
Select A.messageID, A.senderName, A.body, strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S0 ,
A.messageTimeStamp/1000, ‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as messageTimestamp, B.emoji,
B.contain_mine as emojiSentByMe, C.name as ﬁleName, C.localPath from “TARGET CHAT
TABLE” as A, emoji_comment_table as B, zoom_mm_ﬁle as C WHERE
A.messageID ¼ B.msg_id AND A.messageID ¼ C.messageID order by messageTimestamp;
Select sessionID, lastMsgID, strftime(‘%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S0 ,readedMsgTime/1000,
‘unixepoch’, ‘localtime’) as chatStartDate from zoom_mm_session;

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.db

Selects ALL Relevant Contact
Information from Contacts Table
USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.db
Lists Group Chat Participants and
Group Chat Owner Contact
Information
USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db Lists All Chat Messages from Target
Chat Table
USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db Lists All Files Sent and Local Paths for
Target Chat Table

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db Selects ALL Chats from Target Thread
with Emoji Comments

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db Selects Messages with Files AND
Emoji Comments

USERJID@xmpp.zoom.us.asyn.db Selects Chat Session Start Date and
Last MessageID

Appendix B. Artifact Figures

Fig. B.1. Windows VM “USER JID”@zoom.us.asyn.db Database - Displays Zoom Chat Feature Group Messages
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Fig. B.2. Windows VM “USER JID”@zoom.us.asyn.db Database - Displays Files Exchanged Within the Zoom Chat Feature

Fig. B.3. Zoom Account User Credentials Found when Decrypting Network Trafﬁc

Fig. B.4. Chat Message, Sender and Receiver Names Found in Memory through Volatility

Fig. B.5. Chat Messages, Sender/Receiver Names and JIDs Found in Memory Acquired After the Zoom Application had Exited the System through Strings Tool
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